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174 Michigan Law Review [Vol, 68 
Prejudicial In11uence on Jury of Newspaper Published 
During Trial-People 'V. Purvis 
Defendant had been paroled after serving four years of a sen-
tence for second degree murder. While on parole, he was tried for 
another homicide and convicted of murder in the first degree. In 
separate penalty trials,1 juries had twice assessed the death sentence, 
which, on both occasions, had been set aside by the reviewing court. 
During the third trial, the Sunday newspaper in the local county 
published a front-page article attacking the leniency of the parole 
system, attributing the area's high crime rate partly to the recidi-
vist tendencies of parolees, and quoting the county sheriff's opinion 
that defendant should be sentenced to death. The following day 
the prosecution began its closing argument and, over defense ob-
jections, made reference to the article. The jury adjourned for the 
evening without receiving instructions to disregard the statements 
in the newspaper and, the next day, returned a verdict imposing the 
death penalty. On appeal to the Supreme Court of California, held, 
reversed and remanded for a new trial, two judges dissenting. The 
making of public statements concerning the pending trial by the 
1. California and Pennsylvania provide for separate jury trials, after guilt has 
been decided, to determine the punishment for fiISt degree murder. See CAL. PEN, 
CODE § 190.1; PA. STAT. ANN, tit. 18, § 4701 (Supp. 1961). 
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sheriff, directing the attention of the jury to these statements by 
the prosecution, and failure of the trial court to instruct the jury 
to disregard the newspaper article constituted prejudicial miscon-
duct and deprived defendant of a fair and impartial trial. People v. 
Purois, 60 Cal. 2d 323, 384 P.2d 424 (1963). 
In England, newspaper comment that may have a tendency to 
prejudice a pending criminal trial can subject the newspaper to 
proceedings for contempt of court.2 This has resulted in the practical 
elimination of prejudicial, extraneous influences on the conduct of 
trials in England.8 The American press, however, with essential 
differences in traditions and history,4 has not been so constrained.5 
As a result, the rights of the accused to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses, and to have unsworn and irrelevant testimony excluded 
from the trial, may be jeopardized by newspaper publicity and com-
mentary during trial.6 In terms of the rights of individual defend-
ants to a fair trial, the consequence has been what Mr. Justice Jack-
son has termed, in a notable concurring opinion in Shepherd v. 
Florida, 7 "one of the worst menaces to American justice."8 
There is little authority that holds prejudicial newspaper in-
fluence on a trial an unconstitutional denial of due process of law.9 
2. Reviews of the English authorities are found in Holtzoff, The Relation Between 
the Right to a Fair Trial and the Right of Freedom of the Press, l SYRACUSE L. REv. 
369, 371.75 (1950), and in Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 921-36 
(1950). 
3. Goodhart, Newspapers and Contempt of Court in English Law, 48 HARV. L. REv. 
885, 909 (1935). The scope of this note encompassed the influence of other forms of 
mass communication, in addition to newspapers, on jurors. 
4. Hall, Reconciling Fair Trial and Free Press, 18 A.LA. LAw. 404, 406 (1957). But 
see Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 285-88 (1941) (dissenting opinion). 
5. Holtzoff, supra note 2, at 375. 
6. Rifkind, When the Press Collides With Justice, 34 J. AM. Jun. Soc'Y 46, 49 (1950); 
Stryker, Only Courts Should Try Cases, in Conference on Fair Trial-Free Press, II 
N.Y. COUNTY LAw. Ass'N BAR BULL. 32 (1953). It is a fundamental rule of criminal law 
that an accused is entitled to be tried solely on the basis of evidence offered in open 
court. Briggs v. United States, 221 F.2d 636, 638 (6th Cir. 1955). Absent this, the 
result might be jury prejudice against defendant and destruction of the presumption 
of innocence. 38 VA. L. REv. 1057, 1058 (1952). See the examples of the Hiss and 
Hauptmann trials in Bromley, Free Press vs. Fair Trial, Harper's, March 1951, p. 90. 
The impact is likely to be worse if, as in the principal case, jurors receive the ex-
traneous matter during the trial. Holtzoff, supra note 2, at 371. See principal case at 
337, 384 P.2d at 430. This problem is somewhat reduced by the fact that defendants, 
for whom trial by jury was established as a sacred right, are increasingly waiving jury 
trial in favor of trial by judge. Perry, The Courts, the Press, and the Public, 30 MICH. 
L. REv. 228, 232 (1931). 
7. 341 U.S. 50 (1951). 
8. Id. at 55. 
9. Montgomery, The Treatment of Pending Litigation in the Press, 23 N.Y.S.B.A. 
BULL. 314 (1951), citing Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951) (concurring opinion) 
as the only authority. But cf. the following cases which were held violative of due 
process: Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (discriminatory selection of jurors); Tumey 
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (failure to provide disinterested judge); Moore v. Dempsey, 
261 U.S. 86 (1923) (bitterly hostile public opinion in the district of venue). 
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In Irvin v. Dowd,10 the United States Supreme Court did hold that, 
because of the obviously prejudicial effect on jurors of pretrial pub-
lication of inflammatory matter, the accused was denied an im-
partial trial.11 This is a fairly narrow holding, however, affording 
no protection to a defendant faced, not with a clearly inflammatory 
publication, but rather with the publication of incompetent evi-
dence that might influence the jury.12 Nevertheless, the reasoning of 
the Court, based largely on the probable bias created in the minds of 
the jurors, would seem to render the doctrine highly expandable.18 
Trial court discretion in granting a new trial because of sub-
stantial prejudice from extraneous evidence, and appellate review 
of convictions resulting from alleged misconduct or error are the 
most usual methods of protecting the rights of an accused.14 How-
ever, resort to appelJate review is an expensive procedure.115 It is 
10. 366 U.S. 717 (1961). 
11. Id. at 723-28. Defendant was accused of six murders and his trial had become 
the cause ct!lebre of the small community of venue. The Supreme Court found that 
"a barrage of newspaper headlines, articles, cartoons and pictures was unleashed 
against him during the six or seven months preceding his trial." Id. at 725. These 
articles described defendant as a confessed slayer, a parole violator, and as remorseless 
and without conscience. The Court found a pattern of deep and bitter prejudice to 
be present throughout the community, as clearly reflected in the fact that almost 
ninety per cent of the veniremen, including eight of the twelve jurors, entertained 
some opinion as to defendant's guilt. See id. at 727. 
12. Evidence regarding the deterrent nature of punishment may not be presented 
to the jury in a first degree murder trial. People v. Love, 56 Cal. 2d 720, 731, 366 
P .2d 33, 38 (1961). A sheriff's statements of facts predicated on his personal knowledge 
is likewise inadmissible. Cf. People v. Lyons, 47 Cal. 2d 311, 318-19, 303 P.2d 329, 
333-34 (1956). Both of these forms of incompetent evidence probably reached the jury 
in ·the principal case through the newspaper article. See principal case at 339, 384 
P.2d at 434. 
13. Relying heavily upon Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), a federal district 
court has recently taken tentative steps in this direction. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 
F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio 1964). Defendant had been convicted for the murder of his 
wife, but was released in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the court termed his 
trial a "perfect example" of "trial by newspaper." Id. at 63. The murder and trial 
had attracted widespread publicity, especially in Cleveland, where the court found 
that "each of the three Cleveland newspapers repeatedly printed material which 
strongly suggested and, in fact, urged petitioner's guilt." Id. at 57. Although only 
fourteen of seventy-two veniremen stated that they had prejudged the guilt of de-
fendant, the court found that defendant was denied due process of law because the 
publicity during trial made it impossible to maintain impartiality of the jurors. The 
publicity in the Sheppard case, supra, certainly was prejudicial to the defendant, and 
much of it incompetent as evidence, but it does not seem to be of the inflammatory 
nature of the articles in Irvin. Compare Irvin v. Dowd, supra, with Sheppard v. 
Maxwell, supra. 
14. Hays, Let Us Beware of Censorship, in Conference on Fair Trial-Free Press, 
11 N.Y. COUNTY LAw. Ass'N BAR BuLL. 22, 23 (1953). Evidence received out of court 
by the jury is grounds for a new trial. See ALI CODE OF CRIM. PROCEDURE § 365(b) 
(1930); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1181(2). Change of venue and the civil action for libel are 
other possible protective devices. But see Rifkind, supra note 6, at 51 (change of 
venue a solution only in the days before modem communication). 
15. A good example of this is the principal case, here sent back for the fourth time 
for a full scale jury trial on the single issue of the penalty to be imposed. See principal 
case at 353, 384 P .2d at 443. 
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also unreliable in preventing miscarriages of justice because an 
appellate court will disturb a conviction only in an extreme case.16 
The almost fictional device of the customary admonition to the 
jury to disregard certain matter will often satisfy an appellate court 
that there was no prejudice.17 It may well be that criminal trials in 
large metropolitan areas would be virtually impossible without this 
device.18 It is clear, nevertheless, that as long as mass communication 
media are permitted to publish matter pertaining to pending or 
anticipated litigation, the individual's right to a fair and impartial 
trial may be jeopardized. 
The solution adopted in England, that of a broad contempt 
power,19 is barred in the United States on constitutional grounds. 
In a series of three contempt cases20 involving publications which 
could have influenced the trial judge's decision,21 the Supreme 
Court has refused to infringe upon freedom of press merely because 
the commentary has a tendency to interfere with the judicial proc-
ess.22 The small area presently left within the contempt power, as 
limited by the Court's adopted standard of clear and present danger 
to the administration of justice, 23 is not yet clearly defined. Relying 
on the circumstance that these Supreme Court cases have all dealt 
with influences on a judge,24 Mr. Justice Frankfurter suggested that 
possibly a different standard would apply in the case of influence 
on the judgment of a jury.215 This will probably prove, however, to 
be merely one of the factors in the determination of a clear and 
16. Note, !14 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1278, 1290 (1959). See, e.g., Himmelfarb v. United 
States, 175 F.2d 924, 944 (1949) (incriminating and prejudicial error); People v. Hamil• 
ton, 55 Cal. 2d 881, 900, 362 P.2d 473, 484 (1961) (reasonably possible that error tipped 
the scales against defendant). But see King v. Commonwealth, 253 Ky. 775, 779, 70 
S.W.2d 667, 669 (1934) (error had some effect on the verdict). The dissent in the 
principal case felt that the standard was whether the error was in fact prejudicial. 
See principal case at 354, 384 P.2d 444 (dissenting opinion). 
17. See, e.g., Himmelfarb v. United States, supra note 16, at 950-51. This has been 
called an "unmitigated fiction" in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 
(1949), and said to be no answer to the problem in Holtzoff, supra note 2, at 371. 
The admonition to the jury reminded Judge Jerome Frank of the Mark Twain story 
of the little boy ordered to stand in a comer and not think of a white elephant. 
Hays, supra note 14, at 23. 
18. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 251 (1910): Note, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1278, 
1291 (1959). 
19. See note 2 supra. 
20. Craig v. Hamey, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 828 U.S. 381 
(1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). 
21. See Craig v. Hamey, supra note 20, at 375; Pennekamp v. Florida, supra note 
20, at 845; Bridges v. California, supra note 20, at 272. 
22. See, e.g., Craig v. Hamey, supra note 20, at 876. 
23. It has been suggested that almost no contempt conviction against a newspaper 
would be constitutional. Montgomery, supra note 9, at 318. At any rate it seems that 
all doubt will be resolved in favor of freedom of the press. Holtzoff, supra note 2, 
at 377. 
24. See cases cited note 21 supra. 
25. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 838 U.S. 912, 921 (1950). 
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present danger,26 the Court's sensitivity to censorship seemingly 
eliminating the contempt power as an effective deterrent to news 
media interference even with jurors.27 
The conflict between the need for efficient judicial administra-
tion and the necessity of a fair trial, which is inherent in a system that 
attempts to remedy prejudicial newspaper influence on jurors 
through trial court discretion and appellate review, necessarily must 
result. in a compromise of individual rights.28 A responsible press 
that is sensitive to the protection of the right to a fair trial would, 
of course, alleviate much of the problem.29 Similarly, the legal pro-
fession can do much to eliminate trial by newspaper.30 The prose-
cution, whose primary duty is to see that justice is done,31 is often 
chargeable with collaboration in the publication of inflammatory 
material or with exploiting it at the trial.32 Canon 20 of the Canons 
of Professional Ethics generally condemns newspaper publication 
by a lawyer concerning pending litigation,33 but the generality of, 
26. See Doyle, Free Speech and Fair Trials, 22 NEB, L. REv. 1, 15 (1943); Rifkind, 
supra note 6, at 50. This was the approach of the court in Baltimore Radio Show 
v. State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1950). 
27. See Rifkind, supra note 6, at 47, 50. 
28. See notes 15-18 supra and accompanying text. 
29. Rifkind, supra note 6, at 51. There is, however, a great deal to be said for the 
freedom from contempt afforded the American press. The press may correct other 
outside influences, bring corruption to light, and in any event, is unlikely to influence 
hardened judges. Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28 
CoLuM. L. REv. 525, 552 (1928). The forceful example of the Scottsboro case [Powell 
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)) is used to argue that the publicity of a trial is a 
necessary protection. Hays, supra note 14, at 23. Moreover, in light of pressures for 
high circulation, it has been suggested that no voluntary abstention from sensational 
news would prove practical. Bromley, supra note 6, at 95. 
30. One very practical remedy would seem to be discipline by the court of its 
officers, including the prosecuting attorney and the police. Bromley, supra note 6, 
at 95. There is at least one case where action has been taken against a police officer 
for discussing with newspapers matters relating to a pending trial. See report of pro-
ceedings in Courts Haue Power To Defend Themselves From Harmful Publicity, 10 
J. AM. Juo. Soc'Y 133, 138-47 (1927). It is unlikely that there is any case in which an 
attorney has been held in contempt for similar actions. See 20 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 
178, 179 (1963). There is some thought that the evil of trial by newspaper derives 
from the fear of courts to take measures against the powerful newspapers. Perry, supra 
note 6, at 233, 236. This thought led Mr. Justice Jackson to call for the judiciary to 
demonstrate its fortitude. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 397 (1947). 
31. Note, 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 946, 947 (1954). Canon 5 of the Canons of Professional 
Ethics reads in part: "The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is 
not to convict, but to see that justice is done." 
32. Perry, supra note 6, at 233; Wechsler, Conscience of Press vs. Conscience of Bar, 
in Conference on Fair Trial-Free Press, 11 N.Y. COUNTY I.Aw. Ass'N BAR BuLL. 25, 
26-27 (1953). Presumably the prosecuting attorney has more influence on the jury than 
the defense attorney. Note, 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 946, 947 (1954). A good illustration of 
the use of prejudicial newspaper comment at a trial is provided by the principal case. 
See principal case at 334-37, 384 P.2d at 431-33. 
33, "Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation 
may interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due adminis-
tration of justice. Generally they are to be condemned." 
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and consequent difficulty in enforcing, this canon have caused it 
to be widely disregarded.34 Effective enforcement of even the most 
specific canon, however, must depend upon the insistence of the 
whole Bar on adherence to the standard embodied therein.85 It has 
been suggested that watch-dog committees be established by the Bar 
to deal with this single problem of enforcement.36 The legal pro-
fession, in conjunction with the press, has the task of protecting due 
process of law from deterioration through trial by newspaper. The 
task is hardly new or strange, but the evil is unlikely to be corrected 
without leadership from, and discipline within, the legal profession. 
34. See PHILLIPS &: McCOY, CoNDucr OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS 161-67 (1952). 
115. Id. at 179. 
116. This suggestion was made by Judge Rifkind. Rifkind, supra note 6, at 51. The 
enforcement by means of the present disbarment, suspension, and contempt proceed-
ings is probably too lax and diverse from state to state. See PHILLIPS &: McCOY, op. cit. 
supra note 114, at 85-129. This problem is, of course, not peculiar to the Canons in-
volved with trial by newspaper. 
